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Abstract
We study persistence in criminal capital by looking at the effects of inmates’ releases
on crime around prisons in Colombia. Leveraging detailed geographic and temporal
information on the universe of releases from all prisons and crime reports, we find that
property crimes are 16% higher around prisons on days inmates are released. Inmates
specialized in property crimes drive the impacts. Improvements in non-criminal human
capital or longer incarceration spells do not mitigate these effects. These results suggest
the specific deterrence or rehabilitation effects of incarceration are weak for individu-
als with higher initial levels of criminal capital. We also document two externalities
resulting from incarcerating specialized criminals. First, we find evidence of adverse
peer effects. Second, in a back-of-the-envelope estimation, we document that crime
incidence due to prison location drops property values and property tax revenues. Our
results raise concerns about the usefulness of incarceration in its most widely adopted
form.
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1 Introduction
The prison population in the world exceeds 10 million people.1 Every day, tens of thousands
of inmates are released. In the U.S. alone, more than 600 thousand people exit prison every
year.2 A central role of incarceration is to deter offenders who face prison from engaging in
repetitive criminal behavior—a process known as ‘specific deterrence’, in contrast with the
‘general deterrence’ effect of the threat of punishment. Another role of incarceration is to
improve non-criminal human capital by means of prison-based educational and occupational
programs.3 Nonetheless, recidivism rates seem dramatically high. Two-year re-conviction
rates range from 20% to 60% in most of North America and Europe, where data is available.4
Incarceration could affect the probability of recidivism through several ways. Past liter-
ature focuses, for instance, on changes in the severity of punishment (e.g., Drago, Galbiati
and Vertova 2009; Hansen 2015; Mueller-Smith and Schnepel 2021; Tobón 2020), changes
in the probability of punishment (e.g., Anker, Doleac and Landersø 2017; Doleac 2017), the
expansion of criminal capital (e.g., Aizer and Doyle Jr 2015; Mueller-Smith 2015), or changes
in access to and earnings in the legal sector (e.g., Bhuller et al. 2020; Kling 2006; Schnepel
2018).5 However, we know little about the specific deterrent and rehabilitation effects of in-
carceration on highly skilled criminals. We address this question by studying the short-term
impacts of inmates’ releases on crime around prisons in Colombia.
We leverage two features of the Colombian context. First, we use specific coordinates and
event dates to link detailed information on the universe of inmates’ releases with the universe
of property crime reports. We build a panel dataset of up to 5km buffers around all 138
Colombian prisons over more than 1,300 days, from January 2013 through September 2016.
This data aggregates information on roughly 90,000 releases and 250,000 reported crimes.
1See Walmsley (2013) for detailed statistics in 223 countries.
2See for instance Bronson and Carson (2019).
3These effects are rooted in the economic theory of crime introduced by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973).
4See Fazel and Wolf (2015) for a systematic review on recidivism rates. The range is for Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.
5See Doleac (2019) for a thorough review of this literature.
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Second, we address endogeneity concerns by leveraging the quasi-random selection of release
days in each prison. Prison officials process releases on-demand, as convicted inmates meet
the requirements of their sanction, or in-trial inmates are sentenced to time served or reach
a non-guilty verdict. Judicial authorities make the requests as cases are solved and prison
officials cannot delay the release date. Consistent with an exogenous selection process, we
show that conditional on prison location and day fixed effects, prison characteristics are
similar between days with or without releases.
This paper documents six sets of findings. First, property crime reports increase around
prisons on days inmates are released. Using 5km buffers, people report 0.13 more crimes
around prisons on release days than non-release days. The coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels. This magnitude is equivalent to a 16% increase in crime reports
relative to the average number of crimes reported in non-release days. Furthermore, one
additional release is associated with a rise of 0.08 crime reports around prisons (10% relative
to the control mean), also statistically significant at conventional levels.
Second, inmates specialized in property crimes drive the impacts. Relative to non-release
days, people report 0.20 more property crimes when any inmate convicted or tried for prop-
erty crimes is released—statistically significant—but remain unchanged on days other in-
mates exit prison. The difference between both treatment effects is statistically significant
at conventional levels. Relative to the average number of property crimes reported on non-
release days, crimes increase by 26% on days specialized criminals are released. Also, one
additional release of a specialized inmate is associated with 0.09 more crime reports around
prisons (12% relative to the control mean). When one additional, non-specialized inmate is
released, crime reports increase by 0.06 (7% relative to the control mean). While both effects
are precisely estimated, the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant
at conventional levels. In our interpretation, these results suggest the specific deterrent effect
of incarceration is weak, at best, for offenders with higher initial levels of criminal capital.
Third, improvements in non-criminal human capital do not seem to mitigate these ef-
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fects. We examine if the marginal effect of one additional release of a specialized criminal is
lower whether the inmate participated in rehabilitation programs or reached a higher educa-
tional attainment at the time of release. We find that crime reports around prisons are not
lower whether the specialized inmate was or was not enrolled in educational or occupational
training programs while serving time. We also find that crime reports are roughly the same
whether the specialized inmate had a higher or lower level of educational attainment at the
time of release. We cannot argue we identify a causal relationship in this case, because in-
mates self-select to participate in rehabilitation programs or to pursue a higher educational
attainment in prison. Yet, within the group of specialized criminals, those self-selecting to
improve their non-criminal human capital are presumably less likely to recidivate. Hence,
these results suggest criminal capital persists and can even outweigh improvements in non-
criminal human capital.
Fourth, longer incarceration spells do not seem to mitigate the effects either. We also
examine whether the marginal effect of one additional release of a specialized criminal di-
minishes if the inmate served more time. The results suggest crime reports around prisons
remain unchanged whether the specialized inmate served time for a longer or shorter period.
The selection problem in this case is more subtle because inmates serving more time might
already be more willing to re-engage in crime. Nonetheless, these results further suggest the
specific deterrent effect of incarceration is weak for specialized criminals.
Fifth, we document large adverse peer effects. We study whether confinement with
specialized criminals is associated with higher levels of criminal activity on release days.
We find that one additional release of an offender who was confined with inmates convicted
or tried for property crimes is associated with 0.06 more crimes around prisons on release
days (roughly 7%, relative to the control mean). This result is statistically significant at
conventional levels. Non-specialized inmates drive these effects. This implies specialized
inmates do not seem to develop additional criminal skills, but others do if they are in close
contact with specialized criminals. Prison authorities assign inmates to prison wings and
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cells following several legal and availability constraints. While this process is not random,
it is unlikely that inmates who do not have specialized criminal skills for property crimes
but have potential are housed with specialized offenders. Hence we interpret this result as
suggestive evidence of criminal capital production resulting from interaction with peers.
Finally, we further exploit our setting to examine one additional externality of criminal
capital persistence: the effects of prison location on housing prices. We conduct a back-of-
the-envelope analysis of the aggregate effect of inmates’ releases on crime in the surroundings
of prisons. Since specialized criminals exit prison in roughly 15% of all prison-days in our
sample, we estimate release days account for about 4% of all property crimes in the 5km areas
around the 138 Colombian prisons. Morales-Mosquera (2021) estimates that the elasticity
of property values with respect to crime in the three largest Colombian cities is −0.24. This
implies that property values in the surroundings of prisons lose about 1% of their value due
to negative externalities of prison locations. Using official data on property values and urban
density, we estimate that the aggregate effect of current prison locations on property values
amounts to a loss of $15.9 billion, adjusting for purchasing power parity. This also implies
a loss of roughly $78 million per year on property tax revenues, on average.
This paper contributes to a few strands of the literature. First, studies examining the
specific deterrent effects of incarceration. Munyo and Rossi (2015) leverage the quasi-random
selection of release days to study first-day criminal recidivism in Montevideo, Uruguay. They
document that roughly one in four released offenders recidivates on the first day. Green and
Winik (2010) use random judge assignments to estimate the deterrent effect of incarceration
on recidivism in the District of Columbia, and find that incarceration does not deter subse-
quent criminal behavior. Mueller-Smith (2015) uses random courtroom assignment to study
the effects of incarceration on recidivism in Harris County, Texas, and finds that incarcer-
ation generates net increases in recidivism. Rose and Shem-Tov (2021) use discontinuities
in North Carolina’s sentencing guidelines to examine the effects of incarceration on recidi-
vism. They find sizable specific deterrent effects in the short term that decrease over time.
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Their results also suggest that these effects diminish in incarceration length. Abrams (2011)
leverages the randomization of public defenders to study the effects of incarceration on re-
cidivism in Clark County, Nevada, and finds that incarceration has a mild deterrent effect
that rapidly diminishes.6 Our findings are consistent with Munyo and Rossi (2015), Green
and Winik (2010) and Mueller-Smith (2015). They differ from Rose and Shem-Tov (2021)
and Abrams (2011). We extend this literature by examining incarceration effects for highly
skilled criminals, documenting that specific deterrence effects for this population seem weak
or even non-existent.
Second, studies focusing on the effects of educational and training interventions on sub-
sequent criminal behavior. Bhuller et al. (2020) use random judge assignment in Norway
to examine the effects of imprisonment on recidivism. Their results suggest that incarcera-
tion reduced recidivism for inmates who were previously unemployed because they enrolled
in employment programs in prison. Kuziemko (2013) exploits discontinuities in the parole
guidelines in the state of Georgia to study the effects of incarceration and parole on recidi-
vism. She finds that inmates who could not receive parole due to good behavior reduced
their participation in rehabilitation programs and increased recidivism.7 Our results suggest
improvements in non-criminal human capital are less promising in other contexts. Prison
conditions in Colombia are relatively harsh, and the quality of educational and occupational
prison-based training programs is low. We find that these prison-based interventions have
no effect on mitigating subsequent criminal behavior for specialized criminals.
Third, studies on peer effects in the production of criminal capital within prison. Bayer,
Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009) exploit within facility variation in exposure to peers to esti-
6Other studies focus on the deterrent effects of the threat of increasing sanctions. Drago, Galbiati and
Vertova (2009) exploit the 2006 Italian clemency bill and find that one additional month in expected sentence
reduces the probability of recidivism. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) use the fortuitous randomization of trial
outcomes in California and find that the introduction of three-strikes legislation sanctions reduced recidivism
for offenders with two strikes. Mueller-Smith and Schnepel (2021) leverage abrupt changes in the probability
of diversion in the criminal justice system in Harris County, Texas, and find that increased sanctions for
subsequent offenses reduced recidivism.
7Similarly, Landersø (2015) leverages an exogenous increase in incarceration length in Denmark and finds
that inmates who served more time had better employment outcomes likely because of rehabilitation.
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mate the peer effects on subsequent criminal activity using data from Florida. Their results
suggest that juveniles exposed to peers who committed the same offense recidivate more.
Stevenson (2017) use a similar identification strategy and data from the same state to also
examine the mechanisms. She finds that peer effects are not constrained to offenders with
the same criminal history, and that social contagion of negative attitudes seem to explain the
relation between peer exposure and subsequent crime. Chen and Shapiro (2007) exploit the
discontinuity in risk scores that determines placement in higher-security facilities to examine
peer effects on recidivism. They find that inmates who were just above the score recidivate
more and argue that this is due to peer effects from hardened criminals. Our results further
document the adverse effects of peer exposure in future criminal behavior.
Fourth, studies examining the urban determinants of criminal activity. Glaeser and
Sacerdote (1999) use data from the U.S. and document that more female-headed households,
higher pecuniary benefits for crime, lower probabilities of arrest and lower probabilities
of recognition are important determinants of higher crime rates in large cities. Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) use data from the U.S. and find that social interactions—
instances when one person’s decision to engage in crime affects their neighbors’ decision—
account for a large share of non violent crimes. Geographic concentration of crimes has also
been a subject of study of a growing literature in criminology and economics. A systematic
review by Braga et al. (2019) includes a number of studies documenting crime hot spots
within cities and studying interventions to address them.8 Our study documents how the
location of prisons can shape the patterns of criminal activity within cities.
The final contribution of this paper is to fill the large gap in incarceration studies from
outside developed economies. In a recent review of this literature, Roodman (2017) identi-
fied 34 studies and only one was from a developing country. While the number of studies
from developing economies is growing, there is still a dearth of evidence on the effects of
incarceration in fragile contexts.9
8Blattman et al. (2021) and Collazos et al. (2020) document crime hot spots in Colombian cities.
9See Arteaga (2020) on the effects of parental incarceration on children’s educational attainment and
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large cities 12 3,497.8 1,954.6 179.0% 33.9% 1,867,080
Medium cities 60 1,024.5 718.3 142.6% 49.7% 165,558
Small cities 62 333.8 224.7 148.6% 16.5% 15,596
Total 134 930.8 603.5 154.2% 100% 43,011
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for prison and location characteristics. Each city is
located in one of the three groups by dividing the universe of municipalities in the country in terciles based
on their population. There are four fewer prisons relative to our main sample because these prisons closed
between our observation period and 2019.
2 Background and data
2.1 Background
The Colombian prison system is centralized, run by the National Prison Institute, technically
a branch of the Ministry of Justice. It consists of 134 prisons that held about 125 thousand
inmates by the end of 2019.10 The system is divided into six regional offices, each with little
managerial autonomy.11 Regional offices are sub-divided into judicial districts that match
the organization of the Colombian judicial power. Judicial authorities decide who enters or
exits prison, following the Colombian penal code and further regulations. Prison authorities
play a managerial role, e.g., deciding which prison to send each inmate. We describe the
release process in detail in section 3.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the 134 prisons and the characteristics of their
locations. The average population per prison is 604 inmates, while the average capacity is
Tobón (2020) on the effects of prison conditions on recidivism. Both use data from Colombia.
10As we explain below in section 2.2, our sample includes 138 prisons. Four prisons closed between our
observation period and 2019.
11In principle, the system should house only convicted offenders, as on-trial defendants should be placed at
municipal or regional jails. However, with the exception of a handful of cities, the rest does not comply and
but rather pays the National Prison Institute for housing their defendants. As a result, less than 2 thousand
defendants are placed in municipal jails.
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931. This implies that each prison has an occupancy level of roughly 154%. About 9% of
the prisons are located in relatively large cities (holding 34% of all the prison population),
45% in middle-sized cities (with 50% of all inmates) and 46% in small cities (with 17% of all
inmates). All prisons are located in urban areas.12 Appendix Figure A.1 presents a map of
with the distribution and location of all prisons run by the National Prison Institute.
High recidivism rates are one of the core problems of the criminal justice system in Colom-
bia. About one in five convicted offenders is back in the prison system five years following
release.13 This figure is relatively low compared to recidivism rates in other countries, but
being back to prison is a mechanical under-estimate of actual recidivism and impunity in
Colombia is likely high. In 2019, for instance, the Office of the General Attorney charged
three people per every ten homicides.14 Since not all charges lead to guilty verdicts, this
means fewer than three people per every ten homicides were convicted. Moreover, clearance
rates for homicides are presumably larger than for petty crimes.
Furthermore, offenders in Colombia exhibit systematic patterns of specialization and
persistence in criminal capital. Table 2 reports transition matrices on the type of crime
committed in the first and second offenses for inmates convicted at least twice. Each row
presents the type of new crimes committed by offenders originally convicted for the crime
denoted in the row label. The diagonal depicts the share of inmates who recidivate in the
same type of crime. Broadly, most inmates commit the same crime when they recidivate.
This is especially true for offenders specialized in property crimes, as roughly 60% of property
crime recidivists repeat the original offense. Other criminal specializations show similar
patterns, such as drug crimes or criminal possession of weapons, where more than half the
repeat offenders recidivate in the same crime.
12Only one facility is deemed as an agricultural prison. Yet, it is located within 2km of the city center of
Acacías, Meta, a city with a population over 50 thousand.
13See Tobón (2017) for a detailed report on recidivism rates in Colombia, as measured with data from the
National Prison Institute.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2 Data and sample
In this paper, we use three data sources. First, we use data from the National Prison
Institute. This database includes the universe of incarceration spells from January 2013
through September 2016. More specifically, we observe all incarceration spells that were
active by January 2013 and every in or outflow onward until September 2016. For each
incarceration spell we observe socioeconomic characteristics of the inmate such as their age,
gender, place of birth or educational attainment at release. We also observe the prison,
whether the inmates are on-trial or convicted, the crimes they committed or were charged
with, the duration of their sentences, the location of the inmates within prison, participation
in rehabilitation programs or authorization to receive visits. We also observe exact dates of
entry and release. The data includes about 90,000 inmates’ releases.
Second, we use data on crime reports from the National Police of Colombia. This database
includes the universe of reported property crimes over the 2013-2016 period. Property crimes
include violent or non-violent personal or motor-vehicle thefts. For each crime report we
observe exact location coordinates as well as the date of occurrence. The data includes
about 250,000 reported property crimes in the 5km area around the centroid of each prison.
As in any other context, crime reports tend to be under-reported, especially for petty crimes.
We do not expect this to be a problem, to the extent that under-reporting around prisons
should not be systematically correlated with decisions to release inmates.
Finally, we use geolocated prison data form the National Prison Institute. This database
contains the exact location coordinates of each of the 138 prisons run by the National Prison
Institute during our study period. This does not include a few municipal prisons for which
we do not have data, that we discuss in section 2.1.
We organize our data by first assembling a prison-day panel dataset from January 2013
through September 2016. We use the information on incarceration spells to create a set of
treatment variables. For instance, we build a dummy variable that indicates whether any
inmate was released from one prison on one day. We also build an intensive margin treatment
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measure with the count of inmates released from one prison on one day. Next, we use the
police crime data and the geolocation of prisons to create a set of outcome variables. For
each prison we build a buffer of 1-5km around the centroid of the facility. Using the location
coordinates of reported crimes, we create count measures on the number of property crimes
reported around prisons per day. We examine outcomes with both cumulative buffers and
donuts around prisons.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our analytical sample in Panel A, columns (1) and
(2). These are average prison characteristics for each prison-day in our sample. Roughly 71%
of all inmates were new offenders on any given prison-day. About 29% of all inmates were
in prison for property crimes on any given prison-day. These figures are 14% for inmates
incarcerated for homicide, 23% for inmates incarcerated for drug crimes, and 43% for inmates
incarcerated for other crimes. The prison population was relatively uneducated, with most
inmates having at most primary education. About half participated in occupational and
educational prison-based programs. Most inmates were between 21 and 30 years old on any
given prison-day. The average sentence of convicted inmates in any given prison-day was
343 months.
Panel B, columns (1) and (2), reports descriptive statistics on our treatment variables.
On about 24% of all prison-days in our sample, at least one inmate was released. Specialized
inmates were released on roughly 15% of all prison-days in our sample. On average, 0.5
inmates were released per prison per day. About 0.3 specialized offenders were released per
prison per day.
Figure 1 depicts one stylized fact in our data. The figure plots the average number of
reported property crimes per quarter, within 5km buffers of all prisons in our sample. The
three lines split these averages by type of day: days when no inmates are released, days when
inmates specialized in property crimes are released, and days when other offenders (none
11








Control mean S.D. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Prison characteristics (proportion of inmates meeting each condition unless noted otherwise)
Is a new offender 0.711 0.284 0.003 [0.002] -0.049 [0.140]
Is in prison for property crime 0.290 0.167 0.002 [0.001] -0.006 [0.109]
Is in prison for homicide 0.137 0.135 -0.001* [0.001] -0.431** [0.176]
Is in prison for drug crime 0.232 0.172 0.002 [0.001] 0.096 [0.158]
Is in prison for other crime 0.429 0.221 0.001 [0.001] 0.003 [0.112]
Has below primary ed. 0.041 0.036 0.000 [0.000] -0.276 [0.328]
Has at most primary ed. 0.569 0.231 0.002 [0.002] -0.221 [0.289]
Has at most secondary ed. 0.230 0.112 0.001 [0.001] -0.098 [0.314]
Has tertiary education 0.028 0.039 0.000 [0.000] - [ - ]
Is enrolled in occup. prog. 0.559 0.269 0.001 [0.001] 0.055 [0.075]
Is enrolled in educ. prog. 0.485 0.245 0.001 [0.001] -0.020 [0.063]
Is authorized to receive visits 0.819 0.329 0.003 [0.003] -0.039 [0.0.094]
Has minor children 0.697 0.289 0.001 [0.002] -0.154 [0.124]
Is male 0.808 0.376 0.004 [0.003] 0.029 [0.198]
Is Colombian 0.868 0.339 0.004 [0.003] - [ - ]
Is less than 20 years old 0.079 0.045 0.001 [0.000] -0.355 [0.745]
Is between 21-30 years old 0.344 0.154 0.002 [0.001] -0.578 [0.724]
Is between 31-40 years old 0.220 0.099 4.52e-04 [0.001] -0.587 [0.734]
Is between 41-50 years old 0.127 0.067 4.12e-04 [4.24e-04] -0.312 [0.719]
Is between 51-60 years old 0.069 0.046 2.10e-04 [1.77e-04] -0.308 [0.722]
Is between 61-70 years old 0.022 0.020 -3.39e-05 [7.28e-05] -0.572 [0.836]
Is more than 71 years old 0.007 0.011 5.02e-05 [5.46e-05] - [ - ]
Sentence (in months) 343.001 289.261 3.544 [3.173] 8.55e-06 [8.01e-06]
B. Treatment variables
Any inmate released 0.235 0.424 - - - -
Specialized inmate released 0.148 0.355 - - - -
No. of released inmates 0.480 1.237 - - - -
No. of released spec. inmates 0.253 0.796 - - - -
C. Additional tests of balance
p-value of F test - - 0.196
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report summary statistics. Columns (3) and (4) report the coefficients and
standard errors for a regression of each variable on an indicator for release day and fixed effects (the results
from each row come from an independent regression). Columns (5) and (6) report the coefficients and
standard errors for a regression of an indicator variable for release day on all variables and fixed effects
(the results for the complete column come from one regression). Tertiary education and above 71 years old
are the omitted categories for education and age, respectively. The Colombian indicator is omitted due to
collinearity. The reported p-value of F test refers to a joint test of the null hypothesis for all the covariates
(excluding fixed effects). Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes
prison and day fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the prison level in brackets.
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Figure 1: Average property crimes and inmates exit days
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the average property crime reports in the 5km buffer around all
138 prisons in our sample, by type of day: days where any inmate convicted for property crimes is released;
days where any inmate is released but none of them was convicted for property crimes; days with no releases.
specialized in property crimes) are released. Crime rates are highest when specialized inmates
are released. There are, however, potential confounders that prevent us from interpreting
this figure as causal evidence of inmates’ release on crime rates. For instance, weekends have
probably fewer crimes and, as we show in section 3, inmates are released mostly on week
days. We elaborate on the causality argument in the following sections.
3 Research design
In this paper, we are interested in the effects of inmates releases on crime around prisons
on release days. The key selection problem for the identification of causal effects is related
to how prison authorities choose one day and not others to release prisoners. For instance,
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if prison authorities select low-crime days or times to release inmates, a simple comparison
between release and non-release days would underestimate a positive effect of release days on
crime incidence. Conversely, if prison authorities select high-crime periods, the comparison
would overestimate a positive relation.
3.1 How are inmates released from prisons?
The formal procedure to release an inmate is specified in the Colombian legislation.15 For
convicted offenders, the release process consists of two steps. First, judicial authorities issue
a court order requesting the prison authority to release an inmate. These court orders are
an outcome of the criminal trial and certify that the inmates complied with their sentence.
Judicial authorities process cases of inmates assigned to different prisons—those within their
jurisdiction—hence these outcomes are produced independently of prison authorities at each
prison. Once the judicial authority issues the order, prison authorities verify whether the
inmates have any outstanding court orders from other judicial authorities. If not, the inmates
undergo a medical examination to certify their exit conditions and are released. With few
exceptional cases, the release process happens within the same day the order arrives at the
prison authority.
On-trial defendants follow a similar process, whereby judicial authorities issue court or-
ders requesting their release. This happens due to either a non-guilty verdict, a guilty
verdict sentencing the offender to time served, or pretrial release. With the court orders,
prison authorities release the inmate following the same procedure as for convicted offenders.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the days of the week and the months of the
year inmates are released. We split the summaries per regional office of the National Prison
Authority, to reflect differences across prisons. Broadly, we see the same patterns across
regional offices—which also suggests patterns are relatively stable across prisons. Inmates
are released mostly on week days rather than weekends. This reflects working days in
15Specifically, the Prison Code is in Law 65/1993. Articles 52-78 describe the prison regime in detail,
including how inmates are released.
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Colombia, that are followed by judicial authorities as well as most national bureaucracies.
Also, January is the month of the year with the lowest share of release days across regional
offices of the prison authority. Collective holidays of judicial authorities in Colombia explain
this pattern.16
3.2 Is the selection of release days quasi-random?
We examine if the selection of release days is quasi-random by studying whether the decision
to release inmates in a given day is correlated with observable prison characteristics of that
day. We perform three tests. First, columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report the coefficients
and standard errors of different regressions of each variable on an indicator for release day,
prison fixed effects and day fixed effects. Each row presents the results of an independent
regression. These tests are equivalent to a test of balance in the context of a randomized
controlled trial. We find that prison characteristics are similar between release and non-
release days. That is, these results show the expected degree of balance one would anticipate
under random treatment assignment.
Second, columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the coefficients and standard errors for
a regression of an indicator variable for release day on all variables and fixed effects simul-
taneously, i.e., the results for the complete columns come from one regression only. The
unreported coefficients for tertiary education and being above 71 years old are the omitted
categories for education and age. The nationality indicator is omitted due to collinearity, as
some prisons house only Colombian inmates. We also report the p-value of a joint test of the
null hypothesis for all the covariates in the regression, excluding the prison and day fixed
effects. These results also suggest there is no systematic correlation between the decision to
release inmates and current prison characteristics of the day.
We do observe a more precise negative estimate of the share of inmates who are in prison
for homicide in a given day and the release decision. Broadly, however, we deem this as
16While this may seem rather unusual, the judicial authorities in Colombia have a mandated collective
holiday season at the end of the year. These holidays are specified in Lay 270/1996.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on days of the week and months of the year inmates are
released
Regional offices of the National Prison Authority
Central Western North Eastern Northwestern Viejo Caldas
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Day of the week
Monday 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39
Tuesday 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
Wednesday 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
Thursday 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
Friday 0.39 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
Saturday 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26
Sunday 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
B. Month of the year
January 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37
February 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41
March 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
April 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41
May 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40
June 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
July 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
August 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39
September 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.39
October 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40
November 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38
December 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.40 0.20 0,.40
Total 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on the days of the week inmates are released (Panel A) and the
months of the year inmates are released (Panel B), for each regional office of the National Prison Authority.
Each reported mean refers to the proportion of each days of the week or months of the year that inmates
are released.
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consistent with these results showing the expected degree of balance one would anticipate
under random assignment.
Third, since we are also specifically interested on days in which inmates specialized in
property crimes are released, Appendix Table A.1 reports the coefficients and standard errors
of different regressions of each variable on indicators for days when any specialized inmate
was released and days when any others inmate—but none specialized—were released. The
results further suggest selection of release days is not based on prison characteristics.
3.3 Estimating Equation
To study the effects of inmates’ releases on crime around prisons we estimate equation (1)
using ordinary least squares:
Yi,t = βTi,t + δi + γt + εi,t (1)
where Y is the number of property crimes reported on day t around prison i within a given
buffer. T is our treatment variable. In our extensive margin analysis, the treatment variable
is an indicator that takes the value 1 if any inmates were released from prison i on day
t. In our intensive margin analysis, the treatment variable is the count of inmates who
were released from prison i on day t. δ is a vector of prison fixed effects. This vector
allows us to control for unobserved prison characteristics that do not vary over time, such
as the managerial capacity of the director, the quality of the rehabilitation programs, or the
criminogenic environment of the prison’s surroundings. γ is a vector of day fixed effects.
This vector allows us to control for unobserved day characteristics that are common for all
prisons, such as the crime trends per day of the week or month of the year. ε represents an
error term. Our coefficient of interest is β. In all estimations, we cluster standard errors at
the prison level.
Note our specification of equation (1) resembles a two-way fixed effects difference-in-
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differences estimator. As Goodman-Bacon (2021) documents, a causal interpretation of
these estimates requires both parallel trends and treatment effects that are constant over
time. In our setting, the quasi-randomness of the selection process suggests the parallel trend
assumption holds. Moreover, due to the nature of the process, with thousands of inmates
being released over thousands of days from all prisons, we do not expect treatment effects
to vary over time.
In section 4 below, we also report results from estimations of alternative versions of
equation (1). For instance, in the extensive margin analysis, we split T into two indicators:
days when any specialized inmate was released and days when any other inmates—but none
specialized—were released. In our intensive margin analysis, we also split T into two counts:
number of released specialized inmates and number of released non-specialized inmates.
4 Criminal capital persistence
4.1 Effects of inmates’ releases on crime
Table 5 reports the baseline results for the effects of inmates’ releases on crimes around
prisons, estimating equation (1). The dependent variable is the count of reported property
crimes around the centroid of the prison, within buffers of 1-5km. The size of the buffer
entails a bias-precision trade-of: a smaller buffer captures the effect more directly but covers
lower levels of variation in the outcome variable. We are agnostic on the specification and
report all buffer sizes in most of our estimations.
Panel A presents the extensive margin effects. That is, the treatment variable is an
indicator that takes the value 1 if any inmates were released from prison i on day t. Broadly,
the results suggest that property crime reports are higher around prisons on days inmates
are released. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels in all regressions. The magnitude of the coefficient grows larger as we extend the size
of the buffer. At 5km buffers, we observe 0.13 additional reported property crimes around
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prisons. The average number of reported property crimes on non-release days is 0.79. This
implies crime reports are roughly 16% higher on release days.
Panel B reports the intensive margin effects. In this case, the treatment variable is
the count of inmates released from prison i on day t. Similar to the results on the extensive
margin, the estimates suggest that property crime reports are higher around prisons for every
additional inmate released. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant
at conventional levels in all regressions except for the 1km buffer. This is expected due to
the smaller magnitude of the effect and the bias-precision trade-of we describe above. The
magnitude of the coefficient also grows larger as we extend the size of the buffer. At 5km
buffers, we observe an increase in 0.08 reported property crimes around prisons for each
additional inmate released. Relative to the average number of reported property crimes on
non-release days, the magnitude of the coefficient is equivalent to a 10% increase in crime.
4.2 Effects focusing on specialized inmates
We now examine whether persistence in criminal capital drives the effects by focusing on
specialized inmates—that is, offenders who were originally incarcerated for property crimes.
Table 6 reports the results. We estimate alternative versions of equation (1), where we
split the relevant treatment variable into two types of treatments. Columns (2) and (3)
present the coefficient and standard errors for the treatment variable related to specialized
inmates. Columns (4) and (5) present the corresponding coefficient and standard errors for
the treatment variable related to non-specialized inmates. We also test whether these two
coefficients are different, and report the corresponding p-value in column (6).
Panel A presents the extensive margin effects. Here, we split the treatment variable into
two indicators. One for days when any inmate specialized in property crimes was released,
and one for days when any other inmates—but none specialized in property crimes—were
released. The results suggest the increase in property crime around prisons is mainly driven
by the release of specialized inmates. The coefficients for the treatment variable related to
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Table 5: Effects of inmates’ releases on crime, with cumulative buffers
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Treatment is an indicator for release days
Property crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.012** [0.005] 0.247 186,576
Property crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.047*** [0.016] 0.556 186,576
Property crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.074*** [0.027] 0.687 186,576
Property crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.101** [0.040] 0.760 186,576
Property crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.128*** [0.046] 0.793 186,576
B. Treatment is the number of inmates who exit
Property crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.004 [0.003] 0.247 186,576
Property crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.027*** [0.009] 0.557 186,576
Property crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.042*** [0.012] 0.687 186,576
Property crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.059*** [0.020] 0.760 186,576
Property crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.076*** [0.024] 0.793 186,576
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. Column (1) reports the control prison-day
mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the treatment variable. Column (3) reports the
standard errors. Column (4) reports the R-squared of the regression. Column (5) reports the number of
observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the prison level in brackets.
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specialized inmates are positive and statistically significant in all regressions. At 5km buffers,
we observe 0.2 additional property crime reports on days specialized inmates are released.
This is equivalent to a 26% increase relative to the average number of reported property crime
reports on non-release days. Moreover, the coefficient for the treatment variable related to
non-specialized inmates show positive but rather imprecise effects. These coefficients are
systematically smaller than those for the alternative treatment. The differences between
these coefficients are statistically significant, as reported in column (6).
Panel B presents the intensive margin effects. In this case, we split the treatment variable
into two counts. One for the number of released specialized inmates, and one for the number
of released non-specialized inmates. The results suggest that the number of reported property
crimes increase when any additional inmate—regardless of their specialization—is released.
The magnitude of the coefficients, however, suggest that increases in property crime reports
are larger when specialized inmates are released. At 5km buffers, for example, we observe
an increase in 0.09 crime reports for each additional specialized inmate exiting prison (12%
relative to the control mean). The increase in property crime reports for each additional non-
specialized inmate exiting prison is 0.06 (7% relative to the control mean). The difference
between these coefficients is statistically significant at conventional levels, as we report in
column (6). These pattern is broadly consistent across all buffer specifications.
4.3 Effects with exclusive donuts instead of cumulative buffers
Our setting allows us to examine how the effects of inmates’ releases on crime change with
distance to the prisons. Appendix Table A.2 reports the results from estimating equation
(1), but rather than using cumulative buffers around the centroid of each prison to build
our outcomes, we use exclusive donuts. Panel A reports the results for the extensive margin
effects. Broadly, we observe the same pattern as with the cumulative buffers. Relative to the
average number of reported property crimes at each distance, the effects grow monotonically,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We also observe a similar pattern, with property crime reports increasing in all donut zones
with each additional inmate released.
Similarly, Appendix Table A.3 reports the results from estimating the alternative version
of equation (1) with two treatments, using exclusive donuts. Panel A reports the results
for the extensive margin effects. We also observe a similar pattern. The effects of releasing
specialized inmates grow monotonically with distance—relative to the control means. We
see no effects on days other inmates—and none specialized—are released. In the 4-5km area
around prisons, the crime reports are 39% higher on days specialized inmates are released.
Panel B reports the results for the intensive margin effects. The results suggest that property
crime reports increase in all donut zones as more inmates are released. These effects are larger
when specialized inmates exit prison.
4.4 Additional sensitivity checks
We check whether our results are robust to alternative specifications. Table 7 presents
the sensitivity checks using 5km buffers.17 In our baseline specification we treat all release
events equal, whether the inmates who exit prison were convicted or not. Inmates who are
not convicted are less likely to have criminal skills.18 Panel A reports results considering
only convicted inmates. That is, we build our different treatment variables by overlooking
inmates with no conviction. The four rows in the panel resemble our main specifications:
extensive and intensive margins, looking at any release and those of any specialized inmate.
In the regressions focusing on specialized inmates, we control for other releases—we run the
same regressions as in tables 5 and 6, changing only the definition of the treatment variable.
The results are broadly similar to our main specification.
In panels B and C we examine whether our results are robust to regional or temporal
17Appendix tables A.4 to A.7 report the same sensitivity tests for other buffer zones. The results are
similar to the ones we report with 5km buffers.
18Criminal trials are subject to type one and type two errors. See for instance Kleinberg et al. (2018).
Hence we expect some inmates who are not convicted to have criminal capital, and some who are convicted
to not have any criminal capital.
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patterns. Panel B reports our baseline results excluding one regional office of the National
Prison Authority at a time. We are interested in looking at whether one prison or regional
office explains the effects. The results suggest this is not the case, as we observe positive and
precise estimates in all regressions. Similarly, Panel C reports the baseline results excluding
one quarter at a time. In this case, we are interested in looking at whether seasonal trends
explain the effects. We also find positive and precise estimates in all regressions.
5 Heterogeneous treatment effects
To further study persistence in criminal capital, we also examine whether improvements in
non-criminal human capital or longer incarceration spells mitigate these effects.
5.1 Non-criminal human capital
Non-criminal human capital increases the opportunity cost of crime. Hence rational criminals
would be less likely to engage in crime if they improve non-criminal human capital during
incarceration. We examine if this is the case by looking at heterogeneous treatment effects
based on participation in prison-based rehabilitation programs and educational attainment
at the time of release.
Panel A in Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the count of released specialized inmates (reported in columns 2-3),
the count of released inmates who enrolled in prison-based educational programs (reported
in columns 4-5), the count of released inmates meeting both conditions (reported in columns
6-7), and prison and day fixed effects. The coefficients in column (6) are all positive, and
broadly precise across buffer sizes. This implies that crime rates are even higher when the
specialized inmates who are released participated in educational programs.
Panel B in Table 8 reports the results from analogous regressions that differ only in the
type of program in which the released inmates enrolled. In this case, we focus on inmates
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Table 7: Sensitivity checks
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Only convicted inmates, treatment definition in each row (5km buffers)
Any inmate is released 0.872 0.120** [0.048] 0.793 186,576
No. of released inmates 0.872 0.068*** [0.023] 0.793 186,576
Any specialized inmate is released 0.931 0.194*** [0.062] 0.793 186,576
No. of released spec. inmates 0.931 0.105*** [0.031] 0.793 186,576
Panel B: Excluding one regional office of the prison authority at a time (5km buffers)
Excluding Central region 0.805 0.087** [0.043] 0.770 129,792
Excluding Western region 0.745 0.128** [0.051] 0.776 154,128
Excluding North region 0.686 0.145*** [0.053] 0.805 164,944
Excluding Eastern region 0.808 0.120** [0.050] 0.795 167,648
Excluding Northwestern region 0.885 0.137*** [0.052] 0.798 158,184
Excluding Viejo Caldas region 0.814 0.141*** [0.052] 0.801 158,184
Panel C: Excluding one quarter at a time (5km buffers)
Excluding Quarter 1 0.774 0.126*** [0.045] 0.795 136,758
Excluding Quarter 2 0.782 0.134*** [0.045] 0.791 136,344
Excluding Quarter 3 0.786 0.134*** [0.047] 0.787 138,138
Excluding Quarter 4 0.812 0.117*** [0.048] 0.800 148,488
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. We use 5km buffers in all regressions.
Panel A considers only releases of convicted inmates. The regressions when the treatment definition is
“any specialized inmate is released” and “No. of released spec. inmates” include controls for a secondary
treatment variable (either indicator or count). Panel B checks for robustness by excluding one regional
office of the prison authority at a time. Panel C excludes one quarter of the year at a time. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the relevant treatment
variable. Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) the R-squared and column (5) the number
of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at prison level.
25
participating in prison-based occupational programs. The coefficients in column (6) are all
positive, however imprecise. This suggests that crime rates are not lower when the specialized
inmates who are released participated in occupational programs.
Finally, Panel C in Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the count of crimes
within buffers around each prison on the count of released specialized inmates, the count of
released inmates who have higher levels of educational attainment at the time of release, the
count of released inmates meeting both conditions, and prison and day fixed effects. In this
case, the coefficients in column (6) do not point to any systematic pattern, with the signs
changing from one regression to another. We interpret these results as further evidence that
non-criminal human capital does not seem to reduce the adverse effects on crime following
the release of specialized inmates.
The coefficients in Column (2) confirm our baseline results: reported property crimes
increase each time one additional specialized inmate is released. Focusing on 5km buffers,
we observe an increase between 0.07 to 0.8 in crimes with each additional release (equal to
roughly 9% to 10% relative to non-release days). These results are similar to our baseline
findings on the intensive margin effects reported in Panel B in Table 6.
To discuss causality we need to address an additional selection problem. That is, inmates
self-select to participate in prison-based rehabilitation programs or to reach higher levels of
education. However, if offenders who self-select to improve their non-criminal human capital
are the least criminogenic, we would expect the coefficients in column (6) to be negatively
biased. That is, in our regressions, we are overestimating the beneficial effects of education
and training. Hence, in our interpretation, these results further suggest criminal capital
persists and can even outweigh improvements in non-criminal human capital.
5.2 Severity of punishment
The experience of a more severe punishment increases the expected cost of crime for former
inmates. Again, rational offenders would be less likely to engage in crime if they expect a
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higher cost in case they are arrested. We examine this by looking at heterogeneous treatment
effects based on sentence length.
Panel D in Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the count of released specialized inmates (reported in columns 2-3),
the count of released inmates who served above-median incarceration spells (reported in
columns 4-5), the count of released inmates meeting both conditions (reported in columns
6-7), and prison and day fixed effects. The coefficients in column (6) are negative but rather
imprecise. This suggests crime rates around prisons are roughly the same whether or not
specialized inmates served more time.
The selection problem is more subtle in this case. If the sentencing process leads to
the expected outcomes, offenders with a higher probability of recidivism would serve longer
incarceration spells. Hence, if offenders serving more time are the most criminogenic, we
would expect the coefficients in column (6) to be positively biased. In other words, we are
underestimating the beneficial effects of harsher punishments. Nonetheless, these results
are consistent with the specific deterrent effects of incarceration being weak for specialized
criminals.
6 Further unintended consequences
Criminal recidivism has obvious negative externalities, the main being welfare losses for the
victims and their families. In this section we examine two additional externalities we can
link to the incarceration (and subsequent release) of specialized offenders.
6.1 Peer effects
We first examine whether confinement with criminals specialized in property crimes is as-
sociated with higher levels of property crime reports on release days. A large literature
documents adverse peer effects caused by incarceration (e.g., Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen
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Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Heterogeneous effects for inmates who enrolled in prison-based educational programs
Pr. crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.005 [0.004] -0.004 [0.002] 0.020** [0.009] 0.247 186,576
Pr. crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.023* [0.012] 0.008 [0.007] 0.034** [0.017] 0.557 186,576
Pr. crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.037** [0.017] 0.010 [0.012] 0.055** [0.027] 0.687 186,576
Pr. crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.056* [0.029] 0.013 [0.015] 0.061* [0.037] 0.760 186,576
Pr. crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.070* [0.035] 0.025 [0.018] 0.059 [0.044] 0.793 186,576
B. Heterogeneous effects for inmates who enrolled in prison-based occupational programs
Pr. crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.008 [0.005] -0.001 [0.005] 0.001 [0.009] 0.247 186,576
Pr. crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.030** [0.013] 0.006 [0.008] 0.021 [0.016] 0.557 186,576
Pr. crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.047*** [0.017] 0.006 [0.010] 0.040* [0.023] 0.687 186,576
Pr. crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.068** [0.027] 0.014 [0.011] 0.028 [0.027] 0.760 186,576
Pr. crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.084** [0.031] 0.026** [0.012] 0.032 [0.032] 0.793 186,576
C. Heterogeneous effects for inmates with higher educational attainment at the time of release
Pr. crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.008** [0.003] -0.002 [0.006] -0.005 [0.009] 0.247 186,576
Pr. crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.036*** [0.009] 0.006 [0.012] -0.025 [0.022] 0.557 186,576
Pr. crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.051*** [0.013] 0.021 [0.014] -0.024 [0.046] 0.687 186,576
Pr. crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.066*** [0.017] 0.036 [0.024] 0.005 [0.048] 0.760 186,576
Pr. crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.081*** [0.021] 0.048** [0.026] 0.032 [0.079] 0.793 186,576
D. Heterogeneous effects for inmates who served above-median incarceration spells
Pr. crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.009* [0.005] -0.002 [0.005] -0.001 [0.009] 0.247 186,576
Pr. crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.041*** [0.014] 0.010 [0.010] -0.019 [0.018] 0.557 186,576
Pr. crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.067*** [0.019] 0.020 [0.015] -0.040 [0.027] 0.687 186,576
Pr. crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.088*** [0.025] 0.030 [0.021] -0.050 [0.036] 0.760 186,576
Pr. crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.108*** [0.030] 0.047* [0.025] -0.065 [0.048] 0.793 186,576
E. Heterogeneous effects for inmates who served time along with offenders specialized in property crime
Pr. crimes, 1km buffers 0.114 0.007 [0.006] 0.001 [0.004] -0.002 [0.009] 0.247 186,576
Pr. crimes, 2km buffers 0.345 0.022* [0.012] 0.017** [0.008] 0.010 [0.025] 0.557 186,576
Pr. crimes, 3km buffers 0.537 0.035* [0.020] 0.025** [0.011] 0.017 [0.043] 0.687 186,576
Pr. crimes, 4km buffers 0.689 0.039 [0.029] 0.040** [0.018] 0.036 [0.067] 0.760 186,576
Pr. crimes, 5km buffers 0.789 0.058* [0.035] 0.055** [0.022] 0.023 [0.084] 0.793 186,576
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers around each prison
on the treatment variables and fixed effects. Treatment variables are the count of released specialized inmates, the count of
inmates meeting the condition depicted in the panel header, and the count of inmates meeting both conditions. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the count of specialized inmates released.
Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) reports the regression coefficient for the count of released inmates meeting
the panel condition. Column (5) reports the standard errors. Column (6) reports the regression coefficient for the count of
released inmates meeting both conditions. Column (7) reports the standard errors. Column (8) reports the R-squared of the
regression. Column (9) reports the number of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each
estimation includes prison and day fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the prison level in brackets.
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2009; Chen and Shapiro 2007; Stevenson 2017). Our setting allows us to examine peer effects
resulting from the interaction with specialized criminals.
Panel E in Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the count of released specialized inmates (columns 2-3), the count of
released inmates who served time along with specialized offenders (columns 4-5), the count of
released inmates meeting both conditions (columns 6-7), and the fixed effects we describe in
equation (1). The coefficients in Column (2) confirm our baseline results: reported property
crimes increase each time one additional specialized inmates is released. Focusing on 5km
buffers, we observe an increase in 0.06 crimes with each additional release (equivalent to
roughly 7% relative to non-release days). This figure is similar to our baseline findings on
the intensive margin effects reported in Panel B in Table 6.
The coefficients in Column (4) point to adverse peer effects: reported property crimes
increase each time one additional inmate confined with a specialized offender is released. In
the specification using 5km buffers, we also observe an increase of roughly 0.06 crimes around
prisons with each additional release (also equivalent to 7% relative to non-release days).
Finally, the coefficients in Column (6) suggest these effects do not reinforce one another.
We do not observe an increase in crimes each time one additional inmate specialized in
property crimes who was also exposed to peer effects reaches freedom. The coefficients are
positive, but small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated.
To discuss causality, the selection problem in this case is how prison authorities assign
inmates to one cell and wing and not to other. Broadly, prison authorities assign inmates
to prison wings and cells following several legal and supply constraints. On the one hand,
each prison has an assignment board that decides the cell and wing of each inmate.19 These
decisions follow broad guidelines, considering information provided by each inmate in an
interview, their personal and medical conditions, security and risk assessments, and their
19This board is called the Junta de Patios y Asignaciones, and has five members: the prison director, a
legal advisor, the health and sanitation chief, the security chief and a social advisor (usually a psychologist).
Details are in the Normative Framework of the National Prison Institute.
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legal status. On the other hand, assignment also follows space availability. However, by
the end of 2019, only 6 out of 138 prisons had enough space to house all their inmates (see
Table 1). Hence, while the assignment process is not random, it is unlikely that inmates
who do not have criminal skills for property crimes but have potential are put together with
specialized offenders. We interpret these results as suggestive evidence of criminal capital
production due to peer effects during incarceration.
6.2 Property values
Second, we examine the effects of prison location on housing prices. Previous studies doc-
ument the relationship between crime incidence and urban characteristics of cities (e.g.,
Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999; Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996). We leverage our
setting to conduct a back-of-the-envelope estimation of the externalities of prison location
on housing prices in the context of criminal capital persistence.
We focus on the 5km buffers. Absent releases, we observe an average of 0.79 crimes in
each prison-day in our sample. There are roughly 28 thousand prison-days with specialized
criminals released—about 15% of all prison-days—and we estimate that crimes rise by 0.13
on these days. Hence, broadly, we estimate that release days account for 4% of all property
crimes around prisons. Morales-Mosquera (2021) estimates that the elasticity of property
values with respect to crime in the three largest Colombian cities—Bogotá, Medellín and
Cali—is −0.24. Assuming this elasticity is constant across urban areas in Colombia, this im-
plies that properties around prisons lose 1% of their value as a result of negative externalities
of prison locations.
Official cadastral data for urban areas in Colombia suggests there are roughly 68 thousand
properties in an average 5km buffer. Also, that the average commercial price per property is
about $169 thousand, adjusting for purchasing power parity.20 Hence, 1% of all properties
within 5km buffers around all prisons in our sample adds up to $15.9 billion. Property tax
20We use data from the National Cadastral Authority and the four decentralized authorities (Bogotá,
Medellín, Cali and Antioquia) to retrieve these estimates.
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rates for properties of the average value are generally between 9.4 to 12.3 per 1,000, with
a tax base of 45% of the commercial value. Hence, we estimate that property tax revenues
drop between $67 and $88 million per year for the cities housing the 138 prisons.
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we document that incarceration’s specific deterrence and rehabilitation effects
seem weak—even in the very short-term—for specialized offenders. We examine this question
in Colombia by looking at crimes nearby prisons on days inmates are released.
Relative to non-release days, we find that property crime reports increase by 16% around
prisons on release days. Specialized offenders drive the overall effect—those convicted ini-
tially for property crimes—as the rise in property crime reports is 26% higher on days any
specialized inmate is released. Furthermore, improvements in non-criminal human capital
do not mitigate the effects. This includes participation in either educational or occupational
prison-based programs or even observed higher educational attainment at the time of re-
lease. Finally, through longer prison spells, harsher punishments do not seem to mitigate
these effects either.
We also document two negative externalities resulting from incarcerating specialized of-
fenders. First, we find sizeable adverse peer effects. We observe that property crime reports
rise by 7% each day one additional non-specialized offender, who was confined along with a
specialized criminal, is released. Second, we examine the adverse effects of prison location
on property values due to increased crime incidence. Our estimates suggest that the aggre-
gate impact of current prison locations on property values amounts to a loss of $15.9 billion
nationwide, adjusting for purchasing power parity.
Setting up a prison system to work comes at a high cost for taxpayers. For instance,
yearly expenditures in corrections in the U.S. are about $80 billion or $35 thousand per
inmate (20% of the total justice system expenditures).21 In Colombia, yearly expenditures
21See for instance Hyland (2019).
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in corrections amount to $1.9 billion or $15 thousand per inmate.22 Hence it is essential,
from a policy perspective, to ensure the prison system works as intended.
For incarcerated offenders, the prison system should decrease crime—and all its social
costs— through three main mechanisms: (i) deter the offender from re-engaging in criminal
behavior; (ii) rehabilitate the offender by improving valuable skills for the legal sector; and
(iii) prevent the offender from committing crimes while incarcerated. Our results suggest
that the specific deterrence and rehabilitation mechanisms do not seem to work consistently.
More broadly, the prison system should work through one additional mechanism: (iv) deter
the general population from engaging in crime due to the threat of punishment. In a recent
review on the effects of incarceration on crime that includes 34 different studies—most of
them U.S.-based, Roodman (2017) concludes that the specific and general deterrence effects
are minimal. Also, that the adverse criminogenic impacts of prison most likely cancel out
the beneficial incapacitation and rehabilitation effects. Thus, putting these conclusions along
with our results, it is far from clear that the use of incarceration—the way countries such as
the U.S. or Colombia adopt it—leads to aggregate welfare gains.
Nonetheless, in some contexts, incarceration does lead to improved outcomes. There is
evidence favoring all the mechanisms we outline above: specific deterrence (e.g., Rose and
Shem-Tov 2021), rehabilitation (e.g., Bhuller et al. 2020), incapacitation (e.g., Buonanno
and Raphael 2013), and general deterrence (e.g., Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich 2003). Our
study, however, focuses on a rather unexplored population: specialized offenders with high
baseline levels of criminal capital. More than 80% of released prisoners in the U.S. are re-
arrested within nine years, and almost 70% are re-arrested within just three years (Alper,
Durose and Markman 2018). In Colombia, 21% of released prisoners are re-arrested within
five years, but for those with prior convictions, this figure rises to 73% (Tobón 2017). Hence,
arguably, specialized criminals represent the most relevant segment of the prison popula-
tion. Our results suggest that we should test current incarceration practices further. This
22See the budgets for the National Prison Authority and the Prison Service Agency.
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includes, but should not be limited to, the attributes of incarceration we examine in this
study: sentences, inmate assignment to specific prisons, wings and cells, and prison-based
rehabilitation programs.
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A Supplementary figures and tables
Figure A.1: Prison location and INPEC regions
Notes: The figure depicts the location of the 138 prisons and the regional offices of the National Prison
Authority.
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Con. mean S.D. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Prison characteristics (proportion of inmates meeting each condition unless noted otherwise)
Is a new offender 0.711 0.284 0.003 [0.002] 0.003 [0.002]
Is in prison for property crime 0.290 0.167 0.002 [0.001] 0.001 [0.001]
Is in prison for homicide 0.137 0.135 -0.001* [0.001] -0.001* [0.001]
Is in prison for drug crime 0.232 0.172 0.002 [0.001] 0.002 [0.001]
Is in prison for other crime 0.429 0.221 0.001 [0.001] 0.001 [0.001]
Has below primary ed. 0.041 0.036 2.64e-05 [1.52e-04] 4.37e-05 [1.70e-04]
Has at most primary ed. 0.569 0.231 0.002 [0.002] 0.003 [0.002]
Has at most secondary ed. 0.230 0.112 0.001 [0.001] 0.001 [0.001]
Has tertiary education 0.028 0.039 6.72e-05 [1.70e-04] 1.18e-04 [1.57e-04]
Is enrolled in occup. prog. 0.559 0.269 0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.001]
Is enrolled in educ. prog. 0.485 0.245 0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.001]
Is authorized to receive visits 0.819 0.329 0.004 [0.003] 0.003 [0.003]
Has minor children 0.697 0.289 0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.002]
Is male 0.808 0.376 0.004 [0.003] 0.003 [0.003]
Is Colombian 0.868 0.339 0.004 [0.003] 0.004 [0.003]
Is less than 20 years old 0.079 0.045 0.001* [4.94e-04] 0.001 [0.001]
Is between 21-30 years old 0.344 0.154 0.002 [0.001] 0.002 [0.001]
Is between 31-40 years old 0.220 0.099 4.38e-04 [0.001] 4.71e-04 [0.001]
Is between 41-50 years old 0.127 0.067 2.73e-04 [4.53e-04] 0.001 [4.38e-04]
Is between 51-60 years old 0.069 0.046 2.25e-04 [1.80e-04] 1.91e-04 [2.22e-04]
Is between 61-70 years old 0.022 0.020 -3.49e-05 [8.42e-05] -3.27e-05 [9.13e-05]
Is more than 71 years old 0.007 0.011 5.75e-05 [5.27e-05] 4.05e-05 [6.61e-05]
Sentence (in months) 343.001 289.261 3.746 [3.158] 3.215 [4.577]
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report summary statistics. Columns (3) to (6) report the coefficients and
standard errors for an ordinary least square regression of each variable on two treatments (type of release
day) and fixed effects (the results from each row come from an independent regression). Columns (3) and (4)
report the coefficients and standard errors for an indicator variable for days on which any specialized inmate
was released. Columns (5) and (6) report the coefficients and standard errors for an indicator variable for
days on which other inmates—but none specialized in property crimes—were released. Significance levels:
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the prison level in brackets.
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Table A.2: Effects of inmates’ releases on crime, with exclusive donuts
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Treatment is an indicator for release days
Property crimes, 0-1km donut 0.114 0.012** [0.005] 0.247 186,576
Property crimes, 1-2km donut 0.231 0.035*** [0.012] 0.530 186,576
Property crimes, 2-3km donut 0.192 0.026** [0.012] 0.597 186,576
Property crimes, 3-4km donut 0.152 0.028* [0.014] 0.638 186,576
Property crimes, 4-5km donut 0.100 0.026*** [0.008] 0.593 186,576
B. Treatment is the number of inmates who exit
Property crimes, 0-1km donut 0.114 0.004 [0.003] 0.247 186,576
Property crimes, 1-2km donut 0.231 0.022*** [0.006] 0.530 186,576
Property crimes, 2-3km donut 0.192 0.015*** [0.005] 0.597 186,576
Property crimes, 3-4km donut 0.152 0.017** [0.008] 0.638 186,576
Property crimes, 4-5km donut 0.100 0.017** [0.005] 0.593 186,576
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within donuts
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. Column (1) reports the control prison-day
mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the treatment variable. Column (3) reports the
standard errors. Column (4) reports the R-squared of the regression. Column (5) reports the number of
observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: Sensitivity checks (1km buffers)
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Only convicted inmates, treatment definition in each row (1km buffers)
Any inmate is released 0.121 0.014** [0.006] 0.247 186,576
No. of released inmates 0.121 0.003 [0.003] 0.247 186,576
Any specialized inmate 0.126 0.022*** [0.007] 0.247 186,576
No. of released spec. inmates 0.126 0.006 [0.004] 0.247 186,576
Panel B: Excluding one regional office of the prison authority at a time (1km buffers)
Excluding Central region 0.115 0.008 [0.005] 0.224 129,792
Excluding Western region 0.107 0.012** [0.005] 0.235 154,128
Excluding North region 0.107 0.012** [0.006] 0.260 164,944
Excluding Eastern region 0.116 0.013** [0.005] 0.252 167,648
Excluding Northwestern region 0.120 0.013** [0.005] 0.251 158,184
Excluding Viejo Caldas region 0.118 0.013** [0.006] 0.257 158,184
Panel C: Excluding one quarter at a time (1km buffers)
Excluding Quarter 1 0.111 0.012** [0.005] 0.552 136,758
Excluding Quarter 2 0.113 0.014** [0.006] 0.554 136,344
Excluding Quarter 3 0.113 0.011** [0.005] 0.553 138,138
Excluding Quarter 4 0.118 0.011** [0.005] 0.566 148,488
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. We use 1km buffers in all regressions.
Panel A considers only releases of convicted inmates. The regressions when the treatment definition is
“any specialized inmate is released” and “No. of released spec. inmates” include controls for a secondary
treatment variable (either indicator or count). Panel B checks for robustness by excluding one regional
office of the prison authority at a time. Panel C excludes one quarter of the year at a time. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the relevant treatment
variable. Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) the R-squared and column (5) the number
of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at prison level.
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Table A.5: Sensitivity checks (2km buffers)
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Only convicted inmates, treatment definition in each row (2km buffers)
Any inmate is released 0.375 0.042*** [0.016] 0.556 186,576
No. of released inmates 0.375 0.021** [0.008] 0.556 186,576
Any specialized inmate 0.394 0.071*** [0.021] 0.556 186,576
No. of released spec. inmates 0.394 0.034*** [0.011] 0.556 186,576
Panel B: Excluding one regional office of the prison authority at a time (2km buffers)
Excluding Central region 0.353 0.035* [0.018] 0.531 129,792
Excluding Western region 0.318 0.042*** [0.016] 0.539 154,128
Excluding North region 0.312 0.052*** [0.018] 0.579 164,944
Excluding Eastern region 0.355 0.046*** [0.016] 0.555 167,648
Excluding Northwestern region 0.386 0.052*** [0.018] 0.563 158,184
Excluding Viejo Caldas region 0.348 0.053*** [0.018] 0.563 158,184
Panel C: Excluding one quarter at a time (2km buffers)
Excluding Quarter 1 0.338 0.045*** [0.015] 0.552 136,758
Excluding Quarter 2 0.341 0.055*** [0.017] 0.554 136,344
Excluding Quarter 3 0.343 0.047*** [0.016] 0.553 138,138
Excluding Quarter 4 0.357 0.042*** [0.016] 0.566 148,488
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. We use 2km buffers in all regressions.
Panel A considers only releases of convicted inmates. The regressions when the treatment definition is
“any specialized inmate is released” and “No. of released spec. inmates” include controls for a secondary
treatment variable (either indicator or count). Panel B checks for robustness by excluding one regional
office of the prison authority at a time. Panel C excludes one quarter of the year at a time. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the relevant treatment
variable. Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) the R-squared and column (5) the number
of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at prison level.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity checks (3km buffers)
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Only convicted inmates, treatment definition in each row (3km buffers)
Any inmate is released 0.589 0.070** [0.027] 0.687 186,576
No. of released inmates 0.589 0.037*** [0.013] 0.687 186,576
Any specialized inmate is released 0.624 0.118*** [0.036] 0.687 186,576
No. of released spec. inmates 0.624 0.059*** [0.017] 0.687 186,576
Panel B: Excluding one regional office of the prison authority at a time (3km buffers)
Excluding Central region 0.547 0.050* [0.027] 0.662 129,792
Excluding Western region 0.500 0.073** [0.029] 0.671 154,128
Excluding North region 0.473 0.084*** [0.030] 0.706 164,944
Excluding Eastern region 0.554 0.069** [0.027] 0.685 167,648
Excluding Northwestern region 0.608 0.080*** [0.030] 0.692 158,184
Excluding Viejo Caldas region 0.545 0.080*** [0.030] 0.696 158,184
Panel C: Excluding one quarter at a time (3km buffers)
Excluding Quarter 1 0.527 0.073*** [0.025] 0.688 136,758
Excluding Quarter 2 0.532 0.078*** [0.028] 0.685 136,344
Excluding Quarter 3 0.534 0.076*** [0.028] 0.680 138,138
Excluding Quarter 4 0.553 0.067*** [0.026] 0.696 148,488
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. We use 3km buffers in all regressions.
Panel A considers only releases of convicted inmates. The regressions when the treatment definition is
“any specialized inmate is released” and “No. of released spec. inmates” include controls for a secondary
treatment variable (either indicator or count). Panel B checks for robustness by excluding one regional
office of the prison authority at a time. Panel C excludes one quarter of the year at a time. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the relevant treatment
variable. Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) the R-squared and column (5) the number
of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at prison level.
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Table A.7: Sensitivity checks (4km buffers)
Control mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Only convicted inmates, treatment definition in each row (4km buffers)
Any inmate is released 0.760 0.098** [0.042] 0.760 186,576
No. of released inmates 0.760 0.053*** [0.020] 0.760 186,576
Any specialized inmate is released 0.809 0.162*** [0.054] 0.760 186,576
No. of released spec. inmates 0.809 0.084*** [0.027] 0.760 186,576
Panel B: Excluding one regional office of the prison authority at a time (4km buffers)
Excluding Central region 0.705 0.067** [0.040] 0.739 129,792
Excluding Western region 0.647 0.098** [0.043] 0.742 154,128
Excluding North region 0.597 0.117*** [0.045] 0.773 164,944
Excluding Eastern region 0.709 0.096** [0.042] 0.761 167,648
Excluding Northwestern region 0.776 0.110** [0.045] 0.764 158,184
Excluding Viejo Caldas region 0.708 0.113*** [0.044] 0.768 158,184
Panel C: Excluding one quarter at a time (4km buffers)
Excluding Quarter 1 0.677 0.101*** [0.038] 0.761 136,758
Excluding Quarter 2 0.683 0.105*** [0.039] 0.757 136,344
Excluding Quarter 3 0.686 0.107*** [0.041] 0.754 138,138
Excluding Quarter 4 0.709 0.093*** [0.041] 0.768 148,488
Notes: The table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions of the count of crimes within buffers
around each prison on the treatment variables and fixed effects. We use 4km buffers in all regressions.
Panel A considers only releases of convicted inmates. The regressions when the treatment definition is
“any specialized inmate is released” and “No. of released spec. inmates” include controls for a secondary
treatment variable (either indicator or count). Panel B checks for robustness by excluding one regional
office of the prison authority at a time. Panel C excludes one quarter of the year at a time. Column (1)
reports the control prison-day mean. Column (2) reports the regression coefficient for the relevant treatment
variable. Column (3) reports the standard errors. Column (4) the R-squared and column (5) the number
of observations. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each estimation includes prison and
day fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at prison level.
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